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We use analytical techniques based on an expansion in the inverse system size to study the
stochastic evolutionary dynamics of finite populations of players interacting in a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma game. We show that a mechanism of amplification of demographic noise can give rise to
coherent oscillations in parameter regimes where deterministic descriptions converge to fixed points
with complex eigenvalues. These quasi-cycles between co-operation and defection have previously
been observed in computer simulations; here we provide a systematic and comprehensive analytical
characterization of their properties. We are able to predict their power spectra as a function of the
mutation rate and other model parameters, and to compare the relative magnitude of the cycles
induced by different types of underlying microscopic dynamics. We also extend our analysis to the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game with a win-stay lose-shift strategy, appropriate in situations where
players are subject to errors of the trembling-hand type.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.10.Gg, 02.50.Ey, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, modellers in biology and related disci-
plines use deterministic ordinary or partial differential
equations to capture the quantitative behavior of dynam-
ical systems in those fields. Such an approach is valid
and accurate only if stochastic effects induced by exter-
nal or intrinsic fluctuations can be neglected. External
noise might result from environmental factors or as an
attempt to include the effects of numerous, but weak,
external effects. Intrinsic fluctuations arise from the dy-
namics of the system itself. One of the most common
sources of such stochasticity in biology is discretization
noise in systems composed of a finite number of interact-
ing individuals. While deterministic descriptions can be
derived, and shown to be exact in the limit of infinite sys-
tem size, finite systems retain an intrinsic randomness,
sometimes referred to as demographic noise [1]. Such
fluctuations can invalidate conclusions based on the anal-
ysis of the deterministic dynamics, turning deterministic
fixed points into stochastic quasi-cycles, inducing helical
motion about limit cycles [2], or giving rise to Turing
patterns induced by intrinsic noise [3, 4]. The existence
of stochastic quasi-cycles has been known for a number
of decades in the context of predator-prey-like systems,
and methods have been devised to distinguish them from
noisy limit cycles [5] .
Only very recently have systematic methods, based on
a system-size expansion of the master equation describ-
ing the microscopic stochastic processes, been devised to
study them analytically [6]. These methods use an ex-
pansion in the inverse system size [7], and are now be-
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ing applied to a number of fields in which quasi-cycles
have been reported, including epidemiology [8–10], bio-
chemical reactions [11], gene regulation [12], and more
recently learning algorithms of interacting agents [13].
The purpose of the present work is to apply these ideas
to problems in evolutionary game theory, and to provide
an analytical characterization of stochastic quasi-cycles
found in computer simulations of populations of inter-
acting players [14].
Evolutionary dynamics in this context is a mathemat-
ical framework describing co-evolving populations. It is
the main tool-kit used in attempts to reconcile the evolu-
tion of co-operation with Darwinian natural selection —
a problem which was listed as one of the 25 most press-
ing scientific challenges in Science magazine in 2005 [15].
The problem of how mutual co-operation is sustained in
a population subject to selection pressure favoring self-
ish behavior is most commonly modeled using the pris-
oner’s dilemma (PD) game [16, 17]. The PD is a classic
game-theory problem in which two players have to si-
multaneously choose whether to co-operate or to defect.
Although the payoff for mutual co-operation is higher
than that for mutual defection, the payoff for defecting
when the other player co-operates is higher still. De-
fection then forms the Nash equilibrium of the game, i.e.
the outcome one may expect if the interacting players are
fully rational. A number of experiments have been per-
formed in behavioral game theory (examples are [18, 19])
and biological realizations of the PD include the study
of competitive interaction among viruses, see e.g. [20].
An extension of the basic PD game considers repeated
interaction of a given pair of players. The space of avail-
able strategies then becomes too large to allow for an
exhaustive analysis. Most studies therefore focus on a
selected set of strategies, such as always defect (AllD),
always co-operate (AllC), tit-for-tat (TFT) or win-stay
lose-shift (WSLS). AllC players always co-operate in any
iteration, and similarly AllD players always defect. TFT
2co-operates in the first round and then copies its op-
ponent’s previous move. This strategy emerged as the
winner in a computer tournament run by Axelrod in
1981 [16]. Since then TFT has been the subject of a large
body of work [14, 21–23]. Even though TFT won a subse-
quent second competition as well, TFT is not perfect. In
more realistic situations where players can make mistakes
TFT can become locked into patterns of alternative co-
operation and defection with another TFT player [24]. It
is also vulnerable to invasion from co-operators via neu-
tral drift. Nowak and Sigmund [25] then proposedWSLS;
this strategy has none of the above disadvantages. WSLS
co-operates in the first round and then keeps playing the
same action (co-operate or defect) if it receives a favor-
able payoff, and switches from one action to the other
if it does not. It can resist neutral drift by co-operators
and can correct mistakes, avoiding disadvantageous cy-
cles. There is evidence to suggest that some animals
employ these strategies, for example, in their behavior in
the presence of predators [26, 27].
Historically, the analysis of evolutionary dynamics has
mostly been based on deterministic replicator dynam-
ics [28], explicitly excluding stochastic effects. More re-
cently, methods from statistical physics and the theory
of stochastic processes have been used to study games
in finite populations. In the absence of mutation, a fi-
nite population will always fix on a given strategy due to
stochastic fluctuations. The resulting fixation probabili-
ties and average fixation times can be calculated [29–31].
Further quantities of interest are stationary distributions
of the underlying stochastic processes [23, 32–34], and
the phenomenon of dynamic drift [35].
In the context of these studies of stochastic processes in
game theory, cyclic behavior has been reported [36–38] in
the rock-papers-scissors game, and in [14], where stochas-
tic quasi-cycles between co-operation and defection have
been observed in finite populations of agents playing the
iterated PD. In the present work we will focus on the
latter game, and provide an analytical theory which al-
lows one to compute properties such as power spectra,
or equivalently the correlation functions of these quasi-
cycles, to a good approximation in the limit of large,
but finite populations. Based on this analytical approach
we are able to identify regions in parameter space where
stochastic quasi-cycles would be expected to occur, and
we compare the amplitude of cycles arising from different
types of microscopic update dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we out-
line the iterated PD and define the different microscopic
processes. We first focus on the case of only three pure
strategies, AllC, AllD, and TFT. The deterministic anal-
ysis for this model is presented in Sec. III with a classi-
fication of the fixed points and an exploration of the pa-
rameter space. We move from a deterministic description
to a stochastic formulation in Sec. IV and consider effects
arising in finite populations. In particular, we carry out
a system-size expansion of the master equation allowing
us to classify the periodic stochastic deviations from the
deterministic limit. In Sec. V we extend the analysis to
include WSLS as a fourth strategy. Finally, in Sec. VI,
we summarize our findings and outline avenues of future
research.
II. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
A. Iterated PD
We will mostly follow the setup of Imhof et al [14]. An
exception will be when we discuss the extension of the
model in Sec. V. As such, we will consider a popula-
tion of N players with each player carrying out one of
three pure strategies: AllC, AllD, or TFT. The respec-
tive payoffs resulting from an encounter of two players is
characterized by the following payoff matrix:


AllC AllD TFT
AllC Rm Sm Rm
AllD Tm Pm T + P (m− 1)
TFT Rm− c S + P (m− 1)− c Rm− c

,
(1)
where m is the number of rounds played when two play-
ers meet. The parameters T,R, P, and S are the payoffs
of the basic PD game (in which players meet only once):
T is the temptation to defect, i.e. the payoff a defec-
tor receives when playing a co-operator, R is the reward
for mutual cooperation, P is the punishment for mutual
defection, and S is the sucker’s payoff for co-operating
with a defector. The so-called complexity cost, c, is im-
posed on the TFT strategy and represents the alloca-
tion of resources used to remember an opponent’s last
move [14, 39]. For the dilemma to be present we require
that the parameters satisfy T > R > P > S and also that
R > (T +S)/2, to prevent mutual alternate co-operation
and defection being more profitable that of mutual coop-
eration [16]. Throughout this paper we use the specific
parameter values T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0.1, and
m = 10 [14]. In the terminology of game theory, the
iterated PD as defined by the above payoff matrix is a
non-cooperative symmetric game.
In the following we will label the strategies AllC, AllD,
and TFT by i = 1, 2, 3 respectively. The number of play-
ers in the population using strategy i will be denoted by
ni, and we require that n1 +n2+n3 = N . The expected
payoff, or fitness, of a player of type i is then given by
πi =
∑
j aijnj − aii
N − 1 , (2)
where aij are the elements of the payoff matrix, Eq. (1),
e.g. a11 = Rm, a12 = Sm, etc. In using the defini-
tion (2) we follow the choices of [17] and exclude inter-
actions of one individual with itself. Definitions with
self-interaction are possible, the differences do not affect
the results to the order in inverse system size we will be
working at.
3The so-called reproductive fitness of an agent carrying
pure strategy i, fi, is defined as [17]
fi = 1− w + wπi, (3)
where w is a selection strength that determines the im-
pact that the game has on the agent’s overall fitness. If
w = 0, then fi = 1 for all i, and one recovers the limit of
neutral selection. For w > 0 selection becomes increas-
ingly frequency dependent. The average reproductive fit-
ness in the population is then given by
φ =
∑
i
ni
N
fi, (4)
and the average payoff is π =
∑
i(ni/N)πi. In order to
complete the model we need to specify the microscopic
dynamics of the system, i.e. we need to define the rules
by which the composition of the population changes over
time. There are several such microscopic processes which
have been studied in the literature, and we will define
some of these in Sec. II C. Before we do so, it will however
be helpful to discuss the standard replicator-mutator dy-
namics commonly considered in the literature. Provided
the microscopic dynamics are chosen appropriately, these
equations are a suitable description in the deterministic
limit, valid for infinite populations. It is however im-
portant to stress that the replicator-mutator dynamics
are not the limiting deterministic dynamics for all micro-
scopic processes, as pointed out in [32, 40], and as we will
discuss in more detail below.
B. Canonical replicator-mutator equation
Within the standard replicator dynamics of evolution-
ary game theory the time evolution of the concentration
of a strategy i is given by [28]
x˙i = xi(f
∞
i − φ∞), (5)
where xi denotes the concentration of strategy i in the
population in the deterministic limit: xi = lim
N→∞
ni/N .
Similarly, we will write
f∞i = lim
N→∞
fi = 1− w + w
∑
j
aijxj , (6)
and
φ∞ = lim
N→∞
φ =
∑
j
xjf
∞
j , (7)
where the superscripts indicate that Eq. (5) are, for suit-
ably chosen microscopic dynamics, valid only in the de-
terministic limit of infinite populations. The basic as-
sumption underlying these dynamics is that individuals
reproduce asexually in proportion to their reproductive
fitness, and that offspring inherit the strategy of their
parent.
If one introduces mutation, so that there is a finite
chance that a player will produce an offspring which does
not use the same strategy as their parent, the above dy-
namics needs to be modified, and the description is then
in terms of so-called replicator-mutator equations [41].
Focusing on the case of M pure strategies we will as-
sume that in a reproduction event a player produces an
exact copy of itself with probability 1 − (M − 1)u and
a mutant which plays one of the other M − 1 strategies,
each with probability u. The parameter u is confined to
the physically meaningful range 0 < u ≤ 1/M for the
case of M pure strategies. For u = 1/M an offspring will
be of any of the M types with equal probability 1/M . It
is convenient to introduce a mutation matrix
qij =
{
1− (M − 1)u if i = j
u if i 6= j . (8)
The replicator-mutator equation is then given by [41]
x˙i =
∑
j
xjf
∞
j qji − xiφ∞. (9)
In the limit of zero mutation Eq. (9) reduces to the stan-
dard replicator equation, Eq. (5).
C. Microscopic dynamics
We will now define the different microscopic processes
we will consider. We will restrict ourselves to dynamics
conserving the total number of players in the population.
To specify a process it is then sufficient to define the
‘conversion’ rates Ti→j , corresponding to events in which
a player of type i is replaced by one of type j. For the
general case with M pure strategies i, j = 1, . . . ,M . We
will limit the discussion to processes of the general form
Ti→j =
∑
k
nk
N
ni
N
gki(f)qkj , (10)
where f = (f1, . . . , fM ). The form (10) is found by,
at each time step, selecting two players, one for poten-
tial reproduction and one for potential removal, from the
population. The player selected for potential removal is
assumed to be of type i, and each term in the sum cor-
responds to selecting a player of type k for potential re-
production. A given combination (i, k) thus occurs with
probability (nink)/N
2. Here we use sampling with re-
placement. Dynamics without replacement of an already
chosen player are equally possible, leading to, for exam-
ple, factors of N(N − 1) in the denominator instead of
N2. The differences amount to effects of order N−1, and
do not affect results to the order in the inverse system
size we will be working at. For a given pair of selected
players reproduction and death actually only occur at a
rate proportional to gki(f), which here we assume to be
a function of the reproductive fitnesses (implying a possi-
ble dependence on the average fitness φ). The factor qkj
4accounts for potential mutation events. The four kinds
of microscopic dynamics we will consider in the following
differ in the details of the function g, which we will de-
scribe below. Choices in which gki does not depend on f
correspond to neutral selection.
Before we define the details of the different microscopic
dynamics some general statements are appropriate. For
simplicity, we will focus on the case of a game withM = 3
pure strategies and in particular the iterated PD game
with strategies AllC, AllD and TFT as introduced above;
generalization to an arbitrary number of strategies M
is however straightforward. For any choice of gki, the
state of the N -player population is defined by the num-
ber of individuals using the AllC and AllD strategies:
n = (n1, n2), the number of TFT players is then given
by n3 = N − n1 − n2. Furthermore the reproductive fit-
nesses f and the average reproductive fitness, φ, are fully
determined by the state n of the system (see Eqs. (2)-
(4)). It follows that the transition rates Ti→j can be
written as functions of n, and the microscopic stochastic
process is described by the following master equation for
the probability, P (n, t), of the system being in state n:
dP (n, t)
dt
= (Ê1 − 1)T1→3(n)P (n, t) (11)
+ (Ê2 − 1)T2→3(n)P (n, t)
+ (Ê1Ê
−1
2 − 1)T1→2(n)P (n, t)
+ (Ê2Ê
−1
1 − 1)T2→1(n)P (n, t)
+ (Ê−11 − 1)T3→1(n)P (n, t)
+ (Ê−12 − 1)T3→2(n)P (n, t).
Here we have introduced shift operators Êi, where i =
1, 2, acting on functions of the state of the system,
ψ(n1, n2), as follows:
Ê1ψ(n1, n2) = ψ(n1 + 1, n2),
Ê−11 ψ(n1, n2) = ψ(n1 − 1, n2). (12)
Similar definitions apply for Ê2 and Ê
−1
2 . Multiplying
both sides of Eq. (11) by n and summing over all possible
states and using a decoupling approximation, valid for
N → ∞, we can then write the rate of change of the
concentration of strategy i as
x˙i =
∑
k 6=i
[Tk→i(x)− Ti→k(x)] , (13)
after a re-scaling of time by a factorN . Clearly this equa-
tion is not restricted to the case M = 3, and holds when
an arbitrary number of strategies are present. Transition
rates in Eq. (13) are found from Eq. (10) using the sub-
stitution ni/N → xi and fi → f∞i , see Appendix A for
further details. Substituting these limits into Eq. (13)
one finds that the deterministic evolution of the concen-
trations of strategies is given by
x˙i =
∑
k 6=i
∑
j
xj [xkgjkqji − xigjiqjk] . (14)
For different update rules this equation differs only in the
specific form of g used.
We will now proceed to give the specific form of the
function gki(f) for a set of different update rules which
have previously been proposed: the Moran process, a
linear Moran process, a local process and the Fermi pro-
cess [32, 35].
1. The Moran process
In the Moran process [42], once a player of type k has
been chosen for potential reproduction and a player of
type i for potential removal, the reproduction event oc-
curs at a rate proportional to fk/φ, specifically we will
choose
gMki (f) =
fk
2φ
. (15)
The arbitrary pre-factor of 1/2, equivalent to choosing
a time scale, has been introduced to allow better com-
parison with other update rules [35]. By substituting
Eq. (15) into Eq. (14) and using Eq. (7),
∑
k xk = 1, and∑
k qjk = 1, one finds specifically for the Moran process
that
x˙i =
∑
j xjf
∞
j qji − xiφ∞
2φ∞
. (16)
It is important to stress that the average reproductive fit-
ness φ∞ is a function of the concentration vector x, and
so φ∞ is a time-dependent quantity. While Eq. (16) is
similar to the standard replicator-mutator dynamics, the
pre-factor (2φ∞)−1 corresponds to a dynamic re-scaling
of time, and so may affect the transient dynamics. The
location of fixed points and their local stability are how-
ever not affected, as a straightforward calculation shows.
2. The linear Moran process
The linear Moran process is defined by the following
choice [35]
gLMki (f) =
1
2
(1 + λ(fk − φ)) , (17)
where λ > 0 is a constant parameter, such that it is
always the case that Ti→j ≥ 0. Notice also that one
has gLMki (f) = (1 + λw(πk − π))/2. A common choice,
which we will adopt in the following, is λ = 1/∆fmax,
where ∆fmax is the maximum possible difference between
fi and φ [35], i.e. ∆fmax = maxk,n |fk(n) − φ(n)|. In
the absence of mutation (u = 0) the deterministic limit
results in the following dynamics
x˙i =
xi(f
∞
i − φ∞)
2∆fmax
. (18)
5Therefore, up to a re-scaling of time by the constant fac-
tor (2∆fmax)
−1, the linear Moran process without mu-
tation is described by the standard replicator dynamics
in the limit of infinite population size. However for u 6= 0
one does not recover the standard replicator-mutator
equations, Eq. (9), from the linear Moran process.
In both Eq. (18) and (for u 6= 0) from the result of sub-
stituting Eq. (17) into Eq. (14), the reproductive fitness
only enters in differences of the form fk − φ or fk − fi
and is normalized by ∆fmax. Since both, fitness differ-
ences and ∆fmax, scale linearly in w, the deterministic
dynamics is independent of the selection strength w for
the linear Moran process. Finally, the linear Moran pro-
cess can be obtained from Moran process Eq. (15) in the
weak selection limit, w ≪ 1. Using Eq. (3) one has
gMki (f) =
1− w + wπk
2(1− w + wπ)
=
1
2
(1 + w(πk − π)) +O(w2), (19)
so that to linear order one recovers Eqs. (17) with the
choice λ = 1.
3. The local process
The so-called local process was first proposed by
Traulsen et al [40] and is based on a pairwise comparison
of one agent’s fitness with another in order to determine
whether or not reproduction occurs. This process has
the advantage that no knowledge or computation of the
average fitness of the population is required to carry out
a microscopic step. The local process is defined by
gLki(f) =
1
2
(
1 +
fk − fi
∆fmax
)
, (20)
where ∆fmax is again required for normalization and
fixed at the beginning, and then remains unchanged as
the dynamics proceeds. As opposed to the case of the
linear Moran process, ∆fmax is now the maximum possi-
ble absolute difference between any two fitnesses fi and
fk: ∆fmax = maxi,k,n |fi(n) − fk(n)|. As with the lin-
ear Moran process the local process does, up to a con-
stant factor which can be absorbed in the definition of
time, reproduce the standard replicator equation (5) in
the deterministic limit if mutation is absent [32, 40]. At
finite mutation rates one does not however recover the
replicator-mutator equation, Eq. (9) [32].
4. The Fermi process
Finally, the so-called Fermi process is an alternative
pairwise comparison process which uses the Fermi-Dirac
distribution instead of the linear functional dependence
on fitness differences as in the local process. It is defined
by [32, 43]
gFki(f) =
1
2
[
1 + tanh
(
1
2
(fk − fi)
)]
. (21)
Unlike the other update rules, the Fermi process does not
reproduce either the standard replicator or replicator-
mutator equations in the deterministic limit. From
Eq. (21) one has
gFki(f) =
1
2
(
1 +
w
2
(πk − πi)
)
+O(w2), (22)
in the limit of weak selection. This is of the same func-
tional form as Eq. (20).
III. RESULTS OF THE DETERMINISTIC
ANALYSIS
As an initial step towards characterizing the outcome
of the iterated PD, we compute the fixed-point structure
in the deterministic limit of the four different dynamics
defined above, as function of the complexity cost c and
the mutation rate u. We fix the selection strength to
w = 1 throughout.
A. General fixed point structure
The qualitative picture one finds is similar for any of
the four dynamics; two different threshold values of the
mutation rate can be identified, we will refer to these
as u
(1)
c and u
(2)
c . For 0 < u < u
(1)
c , one typically finds
three fixed points: a locally stable attractor near AllD, a
saddle point also near AllD, and an unstable fixed point,
located close to the AllD/TFT edge of the strategy sim-
plex, see Fig. 1(a). Following [14] we will refer to this
latter fixed point as the ‘mixed fixed point’. At u = u
(1)
c
the mixed fixed point becomes stable, as shown in panel
(b) of Fig. 1. At u = u
(2)
c , the two fixed points near AllD
annihilate, leaving the mixed fixed point as the only at-
tractor for u > u
(2)
c , see Fig. 1(c). At u = 1/3 the mixed
fixed point is at or near the center of the simplex, see
Fig. 1(d). At this maximal physical meaningful value
of u an individual of any type produces an offspring of
any of the three different strategies with equal probabil-
ity. While this qualitative picture is the same for all four
dynamics considered here, the numerical values of u
(1)
c
and u
(2)
c will in general be different for the different dy-
namics, and they may also depend on the choice of the
complexity cost, c. The overall picture is consistent with
the results of [14], where the standard replicator dynam-
ics were studied and where similar qualitative behavior
was found. Our analysis thus demonstrates that the find-
ings of [14] generalize to a broader class of dynamics. The
only difference between our findings compared to those of
earlier analyses, lies in the saddle point described above,
6FIG. 1: (Color online) Fixed-point structure and flow fields
of the standard replicator-mutator equations for the iterated
PD at c = 0.8 and w = 1. Black symbols are stable fixed
points, white symbols are unstable and gray symbols denote
saddle points. The AllD fixed point and saddle point can
be seen in the bottom left-hand corner of the simplices. The
mixed fixed point (triangle) changes stability at u
(1)
c ≈ 0.0016.
The AllD fixed point (circle) and the saddle point (square)
annihilate at u
(2)
c ≈ 0.005. Arrows indicate the direction of
the deterministic flow in the strategy simplex. The color map
shows the Euclidean speed of the trajectories, ||x˙||. These
images were produced using a modified version of the Dynamo
package [44].
which was not reported in [14], presumably because it
is not an attractor of the dynamics. Although for com-
pleteness we have given a general account of the fixed
point structure, the mixed fixed point will be the focus
of our analysis in the following sections, as it is this fixed
point which gives rise to coherent oscillations induced by
demographic noise.
B. Limit of small mutation rates
Further analytical progress is possible in the limit of
small mutation rates, u≪ 1. For all four cases considered
here the deterministic dynamics, derived from Eqs. (13),
are of the form
x˙ = h(0)(x) + uh(1)(x), (23)
with the mutation rate entering linearly in the resulting
differential equations. We will now make the following
ansatz for a fixed point x∗:
x∗ = x∗(0) + ux
∗
(1), (24)
10-8 10-6 10-4 10-2 100
u
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x
A
llD
0 0.005
xAllC
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
AllD
Saddle
Mixed
(a) (b)
FIG. 2: (Color online) Panel (a) shows the xAllD components
of the three fixed points of the Moran dynamics at c = 0.8
with changing mutation rate u. Circles are the results from
numerically solving the fixed-point equations (25), lines are
from Eq. (24). Panel (b) shows the paths of the AllD fixed
point and saddle point in phase space as u is varied. The
fixed points meet and annihilate at u ≈ 0.005, for u larger
than this value neither fixed point is present.
in the limit of small mutation rates u. Here x∗(0) is a
fixed point of Eq. (13) at u = 0 and x∗(1) captures the
effect of non-zero mutation rates at next-to-leading order.
Inserting Eq. (24) into the fixed-point condition
h(0)(x
∗) + uh(1)(x
∗) = 0, (25)
and collecting terms in linear in u, one then finds
x∗(1) = −J−1h(1)(x∗(0)), (26)
where J is the Jacobian of h(0) evaluated at x
∗ = x∗(0).
Since x∗(0) can be found in closed form from Eqs. (13)
with u = 0, substituting, Eq. (26) into Eq. (24) gives an
analytical prediction of the location of the fixed point at
small u.
In Fig. 2 we compare the outcome of the above linear
expansion with results from a direct numerical evaluation
of the fixed points of Eq. (13) obtained using a Newton-
Raphson procedure. The expansion is seen to be a good
approximation for the location of the fixed point for val-
ues of u up to u ≈ 0.01. From the figure we see that the
AllD and saddle fixed points annihilate at u
(2)
c ≈ 0.005
for this value of c. This annihilation is consistent with the
disappearance of the AllD fixed point at large u reported
by Imhof et al [14].
C. Mixed fixed point and phase diagram
For suitable choices of the model parameters c and u,
the mixed fixed point can be a stable attractor with com-
plex eigenvalues of the corresponding Jacobian. One can
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FIG. 3: A phase diagram showing the regions in the (c, u)
plane for which the mixed fixed point of Eq. (13) for the
Moran process is a stable node, stable spiral, unstable spiral
or is orbited by a limit cycle. The solid line at u = 1/3
indicates that at this value the mixed fixed point becomes a
stable node situated at x = (1/3, 1/3). Note that due to the
procedure used to check for the presence of limit cycles, the
border between the limit cycle and unstable spiral regions is
only approximate.
thus expect coherent stochastic oscillations to arise in
finite populations at those model parameters. We there-
fore focus our attention on the mixed fixed point, and
identify the regions in the (c, u)-plane where such com-
plex eigenvalues are found. More generally we will deter-
mine the nature of the mixed fixed point as a function
of u and c. The result of numerically solving for fixed
points of the deterministic dynamics corresponding to
the Moran process is shown in Fig. 3. We will denote
fixed points with purely real eigenvalues as ‘nodes’ and
those with complex eigenvalues as ‘spirals’. At low values
of c we observe a re-entry phenomenon, where the mixed
fixed point goes from a stable spiral to a stable node and
back to a stable spiral as u is decreased.
Numerically we also observe a region where the dy-
namics converges onto a limit cycle. We are at this point
unable to provide a proof for the existence of limit cycles
or to analytically determine the position of the border
between the limit cycle and unstable spiral regions. We
therefore determine the presence of limit cycles by nu-
merically integrating the deterministic dynamics using
an Euler forward method, starting from the center of the
simplex, allowing for a period of equilibration and then
applying a suitable threshold criterion to detect closed
trajectories. The unstable spiral region is identified as
the region where we do not find limit cycles numerically.
In situations where there is more than one attractor (e.g.
a limit cycle and a stable fixed point near AllD) initial
conditions will determine the stationary state of the dy-
namics. At u = 1/3 the mixed fixed point is located in
the center of the strategy simplex, and becomes a stable
node.
All other update rules studied in this paper have the
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FIG. 4: Phase diagram for the Fermi process. We again see
the same qualitative structure as for the other update rules,
with a difference only in the positions of the boundaries.
same qualitative features as the Moran process, and
hence their phase diagrams are structurally similar to
that shown in Fig. 3, except that the mixed fixed point
does not become a stable node at x = (1/3, 1/3) at
u = 1/3 for rules that use pairwise comparison. Instead,
the fixed point forms a stable spiral close to the center of
the simplex. Although qualitative features of the phase
diagrams are the same for all four update rules, the quan-
titative positions of the borders in the (c, u) plane may
differ for each update rule. For example, Fig. 4 shows the
stability map for the Fermi process. Here the re-entry re-
gion persists for larger values of c and the region in which
the mixed fixed point is unstable is also much larger.
IV. STOCHASTIC EFFECTS AND
SYSTEM-SIZE EXPANSION
Until now we have focused on the dynamics of infi-
nite populations. In this section we investigate effects
arising in finite populations, especially stochastic oscil-
lations arising via a coherent amplification of intrinsic
fluctuations. Such oscillations have been found in a va-
riety of systems as described in the introduction. These
quasi-cycles typically arise in regions of the phase dia-
gram where the deterministic dynamics approach a fixed
point, and so the range of parameters in which systems of
finite populations display oscillations is generally wider
than the region in which the deterministic system allows
for periodic solutions. Fig. 5 indeed confirms that this is
also the case for the evolutionary dynamics of the iterated
PD. In the figure we choose model parameters such that
none of the four deterministic dynamics approach peri-
odic attractors, but instead have stable fixed points with
complex eigenvalues (stable spirals). As seen in the figure
the dynamics in finite populations still generate oscilla-
tory behavior, induced by intrinsic fluctuations. This os-
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The results for the concentration of the
AllC strategy from one run of a Gillespie simulation [45, 46]
for each of the four update rules at N = 10000, c = 0.8, and
u = 0.05. The time averaged concentration of each run has
been subtracted from the data to give the deviation from the
deterministic fixed point.
cillatory behavior is similar to that reported in [14]. The
four panels demonstrate that the quality and frequency of
these stochastic oscillations can vary over a wide range
depending on the details of the microscopic dynamics,
and so we will now go on to characterize their properties
in more detail in order to obtain a more comprehensive
picture of this phenomenon.
The analytical approach we will use to characterize
these fluctuations is based on an expansion of the mas-
ter equation in the inverse system size [7]. This method
is now standard in the analysis of interacting-agent sys-
tems, and we will therefore not present the full details of
the calculation, but instead restrict ourselves to giving a
few of the intermediate steps and the final results. The
starting point of the system-size expansion is an ansatz
of the type
ni
N
= xi(t) +
1√
N
ξi(t), (27)
amounting to a separation of deterministic and stochas-
tic contributions to the number, ni, of individuals of type
i in the population. The first term on the right, xi(t), is
the deterministic trajectory, and ξi(t) captures fluctua-
tions about this trajectory; the magnitude of these fluc-
tuations is expected to be of order N−1/2, as reflected by
the above ansatz. One proceeds by inserting this ansatz
into the master equation (11) and focuses on the prob-
ability distribution of ξ, rather than that of n, so that
one sets P (n, t) = Π(ξ, t). Expanding the resulting mas-
ter equation for Π(ξ, t) in powers of N−1/2 one recov-
ers, at leading order, the generalized replicator-mutator
equation, Eq. (13). At next-to-leading order in N−1/2 a
Fokker-Planck equation of the form
∂Π
∂t
= −
∑
i
∂
∂ξi
(CiΠ) +
1
2
∑
i,j
Bij
∂2Π
∂ξi∂ξj
, (28)
is found [7], where Ci =
∑
k Jikξk. Here J is the Jacobian
of Eq. (13) and B is a symmetric, 2 × 2 matrix, whose
precise form will depend on the exact nature of the mi-
croscopic dynamics, but whose general form is given in
Appendix A. The Fokker-Planck equation (28) is equiv-
alent to the linear Langevin equation [47]
ξ˙ = Jξ + η, (29)
where η is Gaussian white noise with correlations
〈ηi(t)ηj(t′)〉 = Bijδ(t− t′). (30)
In contrast to the Langevin equations derived using the
Kramers-Moyal expansion [32], Eq. (29) contains addi-
tive, rather than multiplicative noise. In the application
we are considering here, we are interested in fluctuations
about the stationary state and so the matrices J and
B are evaluated at the fixed point of the deterministic
dynamics.
Given the linearity of Eq. (29), it is straightforward to
compute the power spectra of the fluctuations ξ about
the deterministic fixed point. Following the steps of [11],
one obtains
Pi(ω) =
〈
|ξ˜i(ω)|2
〉
=
∑
j
∑
k
Φ−1ij Bjk(Φ
†)−1ki , (31)
where Φ = iωI− J and I is the 2× 2 identity matrix.
In Fig. 6 we give an example of the power spectra of
fluctuations about the deterministic fixed point obtained
for the Moran update rule at c = 0.8 (w = 1), u = 0.01,
and N = 12000. Theoretical predictions from the van
Kampen expansion and numerical simulations are in near
perfect agreement. The spectrum shows a pronounced
peak at a frequency of approximately ω = 0.05, indicat-
ing the existence of amplified oscillations with that char-
acteristic frequency. The amplitude of these oscillations
is proportional to N−1/2, see Eq. (27), the proportional-
ity constant is determined by the area under the power
spectrum. Depending on the choice of parameter values
one can then expect the amplitude of the quasi-cycle will
be of order one up to system sizes of 104 or so, i.e. com-
parable to the species concentrations at the deterministic
fixed point. Even for very large populations the oscilla-
tions can therefore be significant. If the trajectory of
the system is monitored over a time scale much smaller
than the oscillation period, then this may lead to inter-
vals in time in which the concentration of AllC is found
to be consistently higher than that of TFT or AllD, that
is, to intermediate periods where co-operation dominates
the population. Such effects may for example be relevant
when evolutionary time scales are much longer than time
windows over which measurements can be made.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The power spectra for oscillations in
the concentrations of the three strategies with Moran updat-
ing for c = 0.8 and u = 0.01. Symbols are the results of a
Gillespie simulation with N = 12000 and approximately 104
runs. Solid lines are theoretical predictions obtained from
Eq. (31). Simulation results show excellent agreement with
the theory.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
ω
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
103
P i
(ω
)
Moran
Linear Moran
Local
Fermi
FIG. 7: (Color online) A comparison of the power spectra for
oscillations in the AllC strategy concentration at c = 0.8 and
u = 0.05. N ranges from 104 to 106 and the number of runs
for each simulation is of order 104.
Having shown that the analytical approach captures
the properties of quasi-cycles accurately, we can now
compare the magnitude of the stochastic oscillations for
the different update processes at the same values of c
and u. The power spectra of the fluctuations in the AllC
concentration are shown in Fig. 7 for the four update
rules at one fixed mutation rate and for a specific choice
of the complexity cost. Results indicate that the Fermi
process produces demographic oscillations of a higher fre-
quency than the other update rules, in line with the time
series shown in Fig. 5. Even though the power spectra
for the Moran and linear Moran update rules are seem-
ingly indistinguishable in Fig. 7, they are not analytically
equivalent.
The magnitude of the peak in the power spectra is
a good proxy for the amplitude of the stochastic quasi-
cycles, and the height of the peak is in turn largely deter-
mined by the inverse of the real part of the relevant eigen-
value of the deterministic dynamics at the fixed point. In
the deterministic system, perturbations about the fixed
point decay with a time constant proportional to the in-
verse of this real part, and it is intuitively easy to see
that the magnitude of stochastic oscillations diverges as
the real part of the largest eigenvalue tends to zero. More
specifically, as shown in [48], the magnitude of the peak
in the spectra diverges as the system approaches a Hopf
bifurcation, where the stable spiral becomes an unsta-
ble one. The resulting delta-function peak in the power
spectrum indicates that a limit cycle is born in the un-
stable phase. This can also be seen from Eq. (31) and the
definition of the matrix Φ. At the Hopf bifurcation the
relevant eigenvalue of J is purely imaginary, and when ω
becomes equal to the imaginary part of this eigenvalue,
the matrix Φ becomes singular, such that the expression
on the right-hand side of Eq. (31), involving the inverse
of Φ, diverges.
In order to compare the relative magnitude of stochas-
tic oscillations in the four different dynamics at fixed val-
ues of u and c, it is therefore useful to determine how far
or near to the instability the pair (u, c) places the re-
spective dynamics. In Fig. 8 we plot the instability lines
indicating the occurrence of a Hopf bifurcation in the
(u, c) plane for the four different types of dynamics. For
any fixed c one finds that u
(1)
c,F > u
(1)
c,L > u
(1)
c,LM > u
(1)
c,M
and that accordingly for any u sufficiently large to place
all four dynamics in the stable regime, the Fermi process
is much closer to the limit-cycle regime than the other
types of dynamics, and would therefore be expected to
have a larger peak in the power spectra. As discussed
above we furthermore find that the Fermi process, with
its alternative form of the pairwise comparison process,
produces demographic oscillations of a higher frequency
than the other update rules, see Fig. 7.
V. ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA WITH
ERRORS
In this section we study an extended version of the
iterated PD game, allowing for a fourth pure strategy,
win-stay lose-shift (WSLS). It is appropriate to include
this strategy in the discussion when so-called ‘trembling-
hand’ errors are considered [23]. Trembling-hand errors
introduce the possibility of a player making a mistake
after they have decided what to play, that is, a player co-
operating when they meant to defect, or defecting when
the intention was to co-operate. We will assume that the
two players make errors of this type independently with a
small probability ǫ > 0 in any given round. TFT’s disad-
vantage is then that it can become locked into a cycle of
alternate co-operation and defection with another TFT
player after a mistake occurs. In such games, TFT can be
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FIG. 8: (Color online) The borders between the stable spi-
ral region (above the respective lines) and limit cycle region
(below) for the different update processes. The black dot in-
dicates the point (c, u) = (0.8, 0.05) used in Fig. 7.
outperformed by WSLS [17]. WSLS co-operates initially
and then keeps using its strategy (co-operation or defec-
tion) whenever it receives payoff T or R and switches its
strategy (from co-operation to defection or vice versa) if
it receives P or S. WSLS does not become locked in such
cycles when playing against TFT or WSLS. We include
the WSLS strategy in our game, extending the dynamics
to three degrees of freedom.
In the presence of trembling-hand errors the outcome
of a PD game between two fixed players and iterated
for a finite number of rounds will generally be stochas-
tic and depend on the timing at which errors occur in
the interaction sequence. In order to simplify matters
we will therefore follow [23] and restrict the discussion
to cases in which an interaction between two players
consists of an infinite number of iterations of the PD
game. It is then appropriate to use the expected pay-
offs per round, i.e. for two fixed players, say of types
i, j ∈ {AllC, AllD, TFT, WSLS}, one formally consid-
ers an infinite sequence of PD interactions, and uses the
mean payoff per round to define the payoff matrix ele-
ments aij . The payoff matrix can then be worked out for
small error rates, and is given in [23] and reproduced in
Appendix B for convenience. The complexity cost, c, is
no longer a relevant parameter now that the number of
rounds is infinite.
Previous work on this game has shown that in the lim-
its of zero mutation and weak selection the population
can either fix on WSLS or AllD depending on the values
used in the payoff matrix [23]. We continue to use the
parameter values given in Sec. II A and explore how the
dynamics of the game depend on mutation and error rates
and identify and classify demographic oscillations. Ana-
lyzing the four update rules given in Sec. II C we again
find a mixed fixed point on which we focus our analysis
— since demographic oscillations may occur about this
fixed point when it is a stable spiral. We use Eq. (13)
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FIG. 9: (Color online) The AllC, AllD, TFT and WSLS com-
ponents of the mixed fixed point for the infinitely iterated PD
for changing u at ǫ = 10−4. Microscopic dynamics are of the
Moran type. Dashed lines are analytical results from a linear
expansion in u, circles are from a numerical evaluation of the
fixed point. The vertical solid black line indicates the loca-
tion of u
(1)
c , i.e. the value of u where the mixed fixed point
changes stability.
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FIG. 10: The stability of the mixed fixed point for Moran
updating in the infinitely iterated PD game in the (ǫ, u) plane.
Note that the border between the limit cycle and spiral saddle
regions is approximate.
with four strategies to track the location and stability
properties of the mixed fixed point as u is varied. The
path of the mixed fixed point at constant ǫ and changing
u for the Moran process, is shown in Fig. 9. The dashed
lines are the result of a similar perturbative expansion
to that carried out in Sec. III, where again we see good
agreement with numerical results for changes in u up to
u ≈ 0.01.
Similar to our analysis of the three-strategy game, we
can determine the stability of the mixed fixed point as a
function of the model parameters ǫ and u. The classifi-
cation of the nature of the fixed points is more involved
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FIG. 11: (Color online) The power spectra for the four strate-
gies with Moran updating at u = 0.02 and ǫ = 0.01. Symbols
are results from numerical simulations at N = 12000, solid
lines are the predictions of Eq. (31).
for the four-strategy game, however, as we are analyz-
ing a three-dimensional dynamical system. Stable spirals
are now fixed points with one pair of complex-conjugate
eigenvalues with a negative real part and an additional
real-valued negative eigenvalue. If the sign of the real
part of the pair of complex-conjugate eigenvalues is op-
posite to that of the real-valued eigenvalue we will refer
to the fixed point as a spiral saddle [49]. Fixed points
with three real-valued negative eigenvalues of the Jaco-
bian are referred to as stable nodes. The resulting phase
diagram for the Moran dynamics is shown in Fig. 10. The
other three types of microscopic dynamics give qualita-
tively similar phase diagrams, but the exact quantitative
positions of the various phase lines will generally be dif-
ferent.
When the mixed fixed point is a spiral saddle the deter-
ministic dynamics can either converge to a limit cycle or
to the attractor at AllD, depending on initial conditions.
For locations in the parameter space where the mixed
fixed point of the deterministic dynamics is a stable spi-
ral, we again observe demographic oscillations, and they
can be characterized analytically in a manner similar to
that discussed in the previous section. We depict the re-
sulting power spectra for the Moran process in Fig. 11.
As seen in the figure WSLS and AllD in particular un-
dergo strong demographic oscillations, with a comparable
magnitude between the two strategies.
As with the iterated PD considered earlier, the am-
plitude of quasi-cycles resulting from an amplification of
intrinsic fluctuations can be expected to be large when a
fixed point of the stable spiral type is located close to the
border between the stable-spiral and limit-cycle phases.
There can then again be periods in time when WSLS
is the most prevalent strategy, despite AllD dominating
the fixed point. The power spectra for oscillations in the
concentration of the TFT strategy resulting from the four
different update rules are compared in Fig. 12. We again
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FIG. 12: (Color online) The oscillations in the TFT strategy
concentration for the four update rules at u = 0.05 and ǫ =
10−4. Symbols are from simulations, lines from the theory.
System sizes in the range N = 104 to 106 are used. For
this particular choice of parameters, the spectra for the local
and Fermi processes overlap, although this is not the case in
general.
observe that the Fermi process exhibits oscillations of a
higher frequency and with a larger amplitude than the
other rules. Although spectra for the local process and
the Fermi process overlap in the figure, this is coinciden-
tal at this point in parameter space, and will not be the
case in general.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper we have used analytical approaches based
on van Kampen’s system-size expansion to study the
emergence of quasi-cycles in evolutionary games in finite
populations. Most existing studies of such effects are of
a numerical nature; we have complemented these giving
a systematic account of the formalism, and derived the
resulting effective Langevin equations which describe the
statistics and correlations of fluctuations in large, but fi-
nite populations. This approach and our general formu-
lae are applicable to a large class of microscopic update
rules, and to games with an arbitrary number of pure
strategies. They are, in principle, also valid for arbitrary
mutation matrices. The results of this paper hence allow
one to predict the regions in parameter space in which
coherent quasi-cycles are to be expected, and to compute
their spectral properties. In particular coherent cycles,
such as reported in game dynamical systems e.g. in [14],
can be understood as a consequence of the combination
of intrinsic noise and the existence of a stable fixed point
with complex eigenvalues in the corresponding determin-
istic system obtained in the limit of infinite populations.
In absence of noise the deterministic system approaches
such fixed points in an oscillatory manner, with oscilla-
tions dying away at a rate proportional to the inverse
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real part of the relevant eigenvalue. In finite systems,
discretization noise leads to persistent stochastic correc-
tions perturbing the system at all times. In the limit of
large, but finite system sizes these fluctuations (the noise
η in Eq. (29), together with the pre-factor N−1/2) can be
seen as a small perturbation to the deterministic dynam-
ics, driving the system away from the fixed point. The
attracting fixed point and the oscillatory approach to it
on the deterministic level on the one hand and the per-
sistent intrinsic noise on the other then conspire to give
coherent and sustained stochastic cycles, with an ampli-
tude largely determined by the inverse real part of the
least stable complex eigenvalue.
We have applied the van Kampen formalism to the spe-
cific example of the iterated PD game, where stochastic
oscillations have been reported in the earlier numerical
study [14]. We have worked out detailed phase diagrams
depicting the nature of the limiting deterministic dynam-
ics and we have studied systematically how the muta-
tion rate and complexity cost, the two main model pa-
rameters, affect the outcome of the deterministic system.
Based on this analysis we are able to predict the parame-
ter regimes in which stochastic oscillations occur. In par-
ticular we find that oscillation amplitudes become maxi-
mal when the Hopf bifurcation line in the phase diagram
is approached from within the stable phase. At the bi-
furcation line the oscillation amplitude formally diverges,
with the power spectrum turning into a delta-function,
and as the instability line is crossed a limit cycle is born.
We have also carried out a detailed comparison of four
different microscopic update rules; results indicate that
their respective phase diagrams are qualitatively similar.
The analysis shows that, at fixed values of the model pa-
rameters, the Fermi process tends to produce stochastic
cycles with larger amplitudes and frequencies than the
other update rules. We have extended our study to a
version of the iterated PD game in which errors of the
trembling-hand type occur with a small, but non-zero
rate. The so-called win-stay lose-shift strategy has here
been seen to out compete tit-for-tat, and accordingly we
have considered a four-strategy space (always defect, al-
ways co-operate, tit-for-tat and win-stay lose-shift), and
have identified the regions in parameter space where co-
herent cycles are most likely to occur. Analytical results
for the resulting power spectra of these quasi-cycles are
confirmed convincingly in numerical simulations.
Mathematical techniques of the type we have used
here, most notably the master equation formalism and
system-size expansions, were first devised in statistical
physics, but they are becoming increasingly more popu-
lar in the game theory literature. This extends to equiv-
alent approaches based on Kramers-Moyal expansions.
We attribute this popularity to the generality with which
these methods are applicable and to the fact that they
allow one to obtain an exhaustive account of the prop-
erties of first-order stochastic corrections to the limiting
deterministic dynamics. Exact analytical results can be
derived for large, but finite populations, and hence these
techniques make simulations on the microscopic level re-
dundant (at least in principle). We expect this to be
the case for games with more complicated strategy struc-
tures, or with interaction between more than two players
such as for example in public goods games. The analyt-
ical approach can also be expected to be applicable to
other, potentially more intricate types of human error.
For such games it may be difficult or time consuming
to carry out reliable simulations and to perform exhaus-
tive parameter searches. Analytical characterizations of
stochastic effects such as the ones discussed in this paper
may then be particularly welcome.
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Appendix A: System-size expansion of the master
equation
The van Kampen system-size expansion has been ex-
tensively discussed elsewhere, together with explicit ex-
amples [6–8], and so here we will only briefly summarize
the general idea and give the final results of the calcula-
tion that are relevant for this paper.
The starting point is the substitution of the ansatz (27)
into the master equation (11) — or its generalization to
more than three strategies. This yields an expansion in
powers of N−1/2, after a re-scaling of time by a factor
of N . To leading order (N−1/2) the deterministic equa-
tion (13) is obtained. To next-to-leading order (N−1)
the Fokker-Planck equation (28) is found. This is de-
fined in terms of two quantities: Ci =
∑
k Jikξk, where
J is the Jacobian of the dynamics given by Eq. (13), and
B a symmetric matrix. Since we are interested in fluc-
tuations about stationary states, both Jij and Bij are
time-independent.
The Jacobian can be obtained in a straightforward
fashion once the dynamics (13) is known. The elements
of the matrix B are found from the N−1 terms in the
system-size expansion to be
Bij =


∑
k 6=i [Ti→k(x) + Tk→i(x)] , if i = j
− [Ti→j(x) + Tj→i(x)] , if i 6= j
.
(A1)
Therefore the deterministic and stochastic dynamics to
the order we are working are entirely determined by
Ti→j(x). This can be found by making the substitu-
tions (ni/N) → xi, fi → f∞i and φ → φ∞ in Eq. (10),
to obtain
Ti→j(x) =
∑
k
xkxigki(f
∞)qkj . (A2)
This explicitly shows how to construct Ti→j(x), once the
process (defined by gki(f)) and the mutation matrix (qij)
have been given.
Appendix B: Payoff matrix for a four strategy,
infinitely repeated PD with trembling hand errors
When two players meet and play the PD game over
multiple rounds their state in round ℓ is defined by their
actions in that round, e.g. player 1 co-operates, player
2 defects. The actions of the pair of players then deter-
mines the payoff they each receive. The payoff matrix
for the infinitely repeated PD game with trembling hand
errors is constructed by considering the stationary distri-
butions of the state of each pair of players, to first order
in ǫ, the probability of a ‘trembling hand’ error occur-
ring [23]. It is given by
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

AllC AllD TFT WSLS
AllC R− ǫ(2R− S − T ) S + ǫ(R+ P − 2S) R− ǫ(3R− T − 2S) (R+ S)/2 + (ǫ/2)α
AllD T − ǫ(2T −R− P ) P + ǫ(S + T − 2P ) P + ǫ(S + 2T − 3P ) (P + T )/2− (ǫ/2)α
TFT R+ ǫ(2T + S − 3R) P + ǫ(T + 2S − 3P ) γ γ
WSLS (R + T )/2 + (ǫ/2)β (P + S)/2− (ǫ/2)β γ R+ ǫ(T + 2P + S − 4R)

. (B1)
where α = (T + P −R− S), β = (S + P −R− T ) and γ = (T +R+ P + S)/4.
